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Abstract
Mobilephoneforensicshavebecomemoreprominentsincemobilephoneshavebecomeubiquitous
bothforpersonalandbusinesspractice.Androidsmartphonesshowtremendousgrowthintheglobal
marketshare.Manyresearchersandworksshowtheproceduresandtechniquesfortheacquisition
andanalysisthe nonvolatile memory inmobile phones. On the other hand, the physical memory
(RAM)onthesmartphonemightretainincriminatingevidencethatcouldbeacquiredandanalysed
by the examiner. This study reveals the proper procedure for acquiring the volatile memory inthe
Android smartphone and discusses the use of Linux Memory Extraction (LiME) for dumping the
volatilememory.ThestudyalsodiscussestheanalysisprocessofthememoryimagewithVolatility
2.3,especiallyhowtheapplicationshowsitscapabilityanalysis.Despiteitsadvancementthereare
two major concerns for both applications. First, the examiners have to gain root privileges before
executingLiME.Second,bothapplicationshavenogenericsolutionorapproach.Ontheotherhand,
currentlythereisnoothertooloroptionthatmightgivethesameresultasLiMEandVolatility2.3.
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INTRODUCTION
According to Serber (2013), there are nine trends in the future that will highlight the significant
increase in demand of Mobile Phone Forensics. Those trends are implementation of BYOD,
enormousgrowthinmobileapplications,tougherencryptioninsmartphones,differenceplatforms
ofsmartphones,theupcomingofWindows8OS,theadvancementofMobileDevicesaswitnesses,
theuncertaintyoftheregulatoryandlegislativelandscape,thetremendousriseofmobilemalware
incidents and the increasing risk of data breaches via mobile device.  Apparently, the trends will
leveragetheMobilePhoneForensicsintothesamearenaastheComputerForensicsinthefuture.

Currently,mostresearchandanalysisofMobilePhoneForensicsarefocusedonstaticdataornon
volatile memory.  Static data that resides on the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), memory cards
suchasexternalSDCardsoremulatedMultiMediaCard(eMMC)andtheinternalflashmemorysuch
as NAND flash memory(Alghafli, Jones, & Martin, 2011; Garfinkel, 2011; Hoog, 2011; Thackray,
2010).Hence,duetolimitedcapacityofthenonvolatilememorystoragemedia,thevolatiledataor
other information such as the application data, internet browsing data and instant messaging
conversationhistoriesareoftennotstoredinthenonvolatilestoragemedia.

Theissuewillbecomemoreevidentwhendealingwiththeencryptionkeys,temporaryfilesystem
and advanced mobile malware. This malware may not store their footprints on the nonvolatile
memory.Hence,theonlyoptionfortheexaminerisbyconductingtheinvestigationonthevolatile
memory.Therearetwotechniquesthatavailablefortheexaminertoperformsuchinvestigation:
traditionalliveresponseandmemoryforensics.WhilstaccordingwithAljaedietal.(2011),thereisa
disadvantage impact on traditional live response technique that might create a significant risk in
losing of evidence.  Therefore, this paper is proposing the use of memory forensics in incident
responsecases.

TheAndroidOShasbecomemorepredominantintheglobalsmartphonesmarketsbothincurrent
andfuturetime.TheusageandadoptionofAndroidOSisnotboundonlytosmartphonesbuthas
been utilized into Netbooks, Ultra Mobile PCs, Printers,  Gaming Devices, Home Appliances, GPS
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receivers, Ereaders, Home Audio, Media Players, TVs, Vehicles etc. As usual, if one Operating
Systembecomesmoreprevalent,thenitwillluremorecybercriminalstotargetitasanobjectto
attack.

It became evident that the growth in usage and market share on Android OS is linear with the
increasing of malicious software that is targeting the Android devices. Moreover, the advanced
malwaresuchasMobileTrojanbankingmalwaremightonlyresideitsdataonthevolatilememory
storage,specificallyonAndroid’ssmartphone.Therefore,theonlyviableoptionforamobilephone
examinertoacquireandanalysetheincriminatingevidenceisbyperforminglivememoryforensic
onvolatilememoryonAndroidsmartphones.

Thepurposeofthisworkistoanswerthequestion:whatistheproperprocedureandwhatarethe
freetoolsthatareavailableformobilephoneforensicexaminerswhenacquiringandanalysingthe
memoryforensicsinAndroidsmartphones?Additionally,theproceduresandfreetoolsshouldbe
appliedwithaforensicallysoundruleofthumb.Therefore,theevidencethathasbeenacquiredand
analysedshouldfulfilthelegalconsideration.TheworkrevealstheLinuxMemoryExtraction(LiME)
application to acquire the memory from the Android devices and Volatility 2.3 for the analysis
process.Furthermore,theworkusestheimageevidencefromDFRWSRodeo2012fortheanalysis
processinordertoshowthecapabilityofVolatility2.3foranalysispurposes.

RELATEDWORKS
There is research, works and presentations that reveal the procedures, techniques and tools for
conducting mobile phone forensics in Android platform, but limited information about how to
performtheacquisitionandanalysisofthevolatilememoryinit.Thingetal.(2010),Case(2012b),
Sylveetal.(2012),Ligh(2013),andMacht(2013)areseveralresearcherswhorevealedthememory
forensicsspecificallyinAndroidplatform.Theprocedureforhandlingmemoryhasbecomecritical
since the memory is volatile. Unproper procedures for acquiringthe memory from an Android
smartphonewouldcausethelossofvitalevidenceforever.BrezinskiandKillalea(2002)showthat
theeveryexaminershouldconsidertheordervolatilityincollectingevidence.Therefore,collecting
thevolatilememoryshouldbeapriorityinanyevidenceacquisitionprocedure.

Sylve(2012)showstheimportanceofmemoryforensicsinmobilephoneforensicsonhispaperfor
severalreasons.First, RAM dumpprovidesbothstructuredandunstructuredinformation.Second,
theuseofstringsonmemorydumprevealsoncrucialevidencesuchasapplicationdata,fragments
ofcommunicationandencryptionkeys.Third,itshowsthekernelandapplicationstructures.Fourth,
it reveals the previous processes, open files, network structure etc. According with Case (2011),
memoryforensicsisvitaltoorderlyrecoveryofruntimeinformation.

Furthermore,worksfromLabs(2013)demonstratetheadvancementofmemoryforensicinAndroid
platformon ChuliMalwareincident.ThismalwareafterinfectingtheAndroid’ssmartphone,could
steal all the credential data such as a phone book and messages. The main goal of the work is
investigatingthemalwarewithLiMEtocapturethephysicalRAMandanalysetheimagewithDalvik
Inspector.ThisprocessfoundtheevidencesuchasthephonenumberandIPAddressofCommand
andControl(C&C)ServerthatbelongtoallegedcybercriminalandsetsofpossibleC&Ccommands.

DigitalForensicResearchWorkshop(DFRWS)hasheldtheannualforensicconferenceandchallenge
since 2001. Both events have created much attention and new progression in the digital forensic
community,especiallyinMemoryForensics.DFRWS2012hasthechallengeregardingwithMemory
ForensicinAndroidsmartphone.Thechallengeistoanswersevenquestionsthatrelatewithbotnet
infectioninaHTCEVO4GAndroiddevice.Thischallengewilleventuallysupportthedevelopmentof
LiMEandVolatilityversion2.3.


85


LiME(formerlyknownasDMD)isaLoadableKernelModule(LKM),whichallowstheacquisitionof
volatile memory from Linux and Linuxbased devices, such as those powered by Android. The tool
supports acquiring memory either to the file system of the device or over the network. LiME is
unique in that it is the first tool that allows full memory captures from Android devices. It also
minimizes its interaction between the userland and the kernelland processes during acquisition,
whichallowsittoproducememorycapturesthataremoreforensicallysoundthanthoseofother
toolsdesignedforLinuxmemoryacquisition(Forensics,2012).

The Volatility Framework is a open collection of tools, implemented in Python under the GNU
General Public License, for the extraction of digital artifacts from volatile memory (RAM) samples.
The extraction techniques are entirely independent of the investigated system, but offer
unprecedented visibility into the runtime state of the system. The purpose of the framework is
introducing the techniques and complexities associated with extraction of digital artifacts from
volatile memory samples and to provide a platform for further work into this exciting area of
research.

WHEREANDWHATISTHEDATAONANDROIDDEVICES
Hoog(2011)dividesthedataonAndroidDevicesforlocatingthedataintotwogroups:DataatRest
and Data in Transit. First, there are five locations that could contain the data at rest: NANDFlash
Memory (nonvolatile memory), memory card such as SD card and Embedded MultiMediaCard
(EMMC).RemovablemediasuchasUniversalIntegratedCircuitCard(UICC)orknownasSIMCardor
SDCardareotherlocatersforDataatRest.ThelastlocationofDataatRestisontheDataBackups
for the Android.  Second, there are three locations that might be contained the data in transit:
NetworkServiceProvider,PhysicalRAM(volatilememory)andtheCloud.

ThereispotentialfordataevidencetobestoredonNANDFlashMemoryandSDCard/eMMC.The
examplesofdatasuchasSMS/MMS,calllogs,voicemail,financialapplications,personalemail,web
history, Google search history, YouTube, pictures and videos, geolocation, game history and
interactions, corporate email and attachments, voice mail and faxes sent via email, user names,
passwordsanddomaininformation,WiFiAccessPointwithitsinformationandpasswords,calendar
items,instantmessengerandcorporatefilesthatarestoredonthedevices.

PotentialdataevidencefoundonUICCofSIMCardinformsofpersonaldatasuchasSMS,EMSand
addressbook/contactlists,securekeyidentificationIMSI,ICCID,ownnumber(dependentonservice
provider), service provider, LAI (local area identity – cell site information), allowed network
informationandPINkeyencryption(Thackray,2010).

Network service provider might give the data with legal consent such as call, SMS and MMS logs.
Voicemailmightberetainedbytheproviderforseveraldaysdependsontheregulationalongwith
IMSI,ICC,IMEI,ESNandMSN.Internettraffic,emails,webactivity,subscriberinformation,andPUK
code are examples of data from provider. The cell site analysis and triangulation to identity the
movement and location or users/devices are examples of  data that might be collected from the
provider(Thackray,2010).

There could be various obtained data on physical memory (RAM) such as passwords, twofactor
authentication,passwordresetsecurityresponsesanddatadisplayedintheapplication,butsaved
or cached to nonvolatile storage (e.g. account numbers and balances).  Examiners can recover
process information on RAM such as process listing, memory maps, open files and networking
informationsuchasnetworkinterfaceinformation,openandlisteningsockets,andARPtables.
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TYPEOFTECHNIQUEFORDATAACQUISITION
AccordingtoBrothers(2007)andHoog(2011),therearefivetechniquesthatavailableforacquiring
the data from a mobile phone: manual extraction, logical extraction, physical extraction including
JTAG technique, chipoff and macro read.  All the techniques might be applied on the Android
smartphone. There are several tools available for supporting such techniques with hardware and
softwarebased tools.  Commercial, freeware and opensource applicationsare available for data
acquisitionfrommobilephones.

A presentation by viaForensics (2011) proposed various acquisition techniques such as SD card
analysis using physical and simulated techniques, examining the backups, using Android Debug
Bridge(adb),AFLogicalAppandviaExtractApp.ThereareseveralcompellingfeaturesinviaExtract
such as SD Card imaging and Android Physical. The application images the SD card without
removeingitfromthedevice.ThisfeatureisessentialsincemanyAndroiddevicesstilllocatesitsSD
card under the battery. This condition will create an obstacle if the examiner wants to dump the
memoryfromphysical(RAM)intotheSDcard.TheexaminershouldimagetheSDcardbeforethe
they want to dump the memory in the first place without removing the battery to access the SD
card,otherwisethedataonthememorywillbelost.

Two methods are available for data extraction of running processes in Android smartphone. First,
the examiner uses the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) to access a shell on the device and execute
specific commands to dump the data, such as running processes, network connections and other
device logs.  Second, the examiner uses the Dalvik Debugging Monitor Server (DDMS), a tool that
comestogetherwiththeAndroidSDKfordumpingthecontentsofmemoryofarunningprocessin
theAndroidsmartphone.Nevertheless,noneofthemethodsdescribedabovehasproventodump
the‘fullcontents’orallofthepagesonthememory(Valenzuela,2013).

Joe Sylve, et al. (2012) creates new kernel module for dumping the memory on Android devices,
namedDroidMemoryDumpstr(DMD)orknownasLinuxExtractionMemory(LiME).Thistechnique
couldbecategorisedasphysicalextraction,becausethetheprocessperformedbydumpingthedata
onthememory.ThemainprobleminthistechniqueisanexaminerneedstowritetheSDCardfor
dumpingthememory.Itseemsthatthetechniqueisviolatingthecommonforensicruleofthumb,
but the only nonvolatile removable storage that could store the memory dump is the SD Card.
Another issue is whether the SD Card is underneath the battery.  Removing the battery could
diminishthedataonthephysicalmemory,hencethesolutionistotetherAndroidSmartphoneon
USBmode,imagetheSDCardandfinallydumpthememoryintoSDCard(JosephSylve,2012).

PROPERPROCEDUREFORACQUISITION
ProcedureforAcquisition
L.Simao et al., 2011 proposed the procedure to acquire the data on Android Smartphone with
regards to  five conditions: turn on/off condition, availability of removable card, locked/unlocked
condition, lockable/unlockable feature and super user feature.  These conditions will affect the
procedures,stepstobetakenandtoolstobeusedforacquiringthedatabytheexaminer.Thepaper
doesnotdiscusstheproperprocedureforsecuringandhandlingtheAndroiddevicespriortodata
acquisition.TheworkflowoftheprocedureisshownonFigure1.
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Figure1:WorkflowwiththeprocessofacquiringdatawiththeAndroidoperatingsystem(deL,etal.,2011)


The work supports the procedure since its proceeding the extraction of memory card (SD
Card/eMMC) before dumping the memory. Memory dumping process needs the media storage to
store the image and the only option available is the memory card. Care should be taken that the
process of dumping the memory should not turnoff the smartphone to access the memory card.
This process turned out to be the only possible method if the smartphone uses a nonremovable
memorycardsuchaseMMC.Therefore,theexaminershouldperformphysicalextractionuponthe
memory card before dumping the memory.  In order to improve the procedure, the work directly
suggest to dump the memory without asking whether the relevant application is running on the
Androidsmartphone.

LinuxMemoryExtraction(LiME)
LiMEwascreatedtoovercomethelimitationthatexistontheprevioustools.Traditionally,memory
capturesonLinuxisacquiredbyaccessingthe/dev/memdevice,whichcontainedamapofthefirst
gigabyteofRAM.Thisallowedacquisitionof896MBofphysicalmemorywithouttheneedtoload
codeintothekernel.Thisapproachdidnotworkformachineswithmorethan896MBofRAM.The
/dev/mem device has recently been disabled, due to security concerns on all major Linux
distributionsasitallowedforreadingandwritingofkernelmemory.

In order to capture all physical memory, regardless of size, and to work around the loss of the
/dev/memdevice,IvorKollarcreatedfmem.AccordingtoJoeSylveetal.(2012)thefmemmodule
doesnotworkonAndroiddevices.Hence,theycreatetheLiMEspecificallytoovercometheissue.
Ontheotherhand,LiMEstillusestheloadablekernelmodulelikefmem.Theimportantfeatureof
LiME is the capability of dumping the memory directly to SD card or over the network (network
dumpoveradb).Thetargetofthefeatureisminimizinganinteractionbetweenuserandkernelland.
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Moreover, it allows examiners to produce acquired memory that is more forensically sound than
othertoolsdesignedforLinuxmemoryacquisition.

ForensicallySoundProcessonLiME
AccordingwithJoeSylve,etal.,(2012)therearethreereasonswhyLiMEmeetsthebasicforensic
soundnessstandard.First,itattemptstominimizetheimpactonthetargetdevicewhentransferring
datatoandfromit.Second,onlyaUSBconnectionwiththephoneisneededforinteraction.Once
connected, only a single binary (the kernel module) needs to be transferred and executed to
perform the acquisition.  Third, loading of the module requires a minimal footprint as the LiME
moduleissmall(~70KB)andrequiresfewkernelfunctionstoacquirememory.

JosephSylve(2012),hasperformedatestforthesoundnessofDMD/LiMEbycomparingtheRAM
SnapshotusingtheemulatorwithRAMimagethathaveacquiredwithDMDbothbyTCPanddirect
SDCardandfmem.TheresultonTable1showsthepercentageofidenticalpages.Thistestshows
theeffectivenessofLiMEincapturingthepagesinphysicalmemory(RAM)andalsosupportingthe
claimofforensicsoundnessonLiME.

Table1:PercentageofIdenticalPagesonDMDandFmem(JosephSylve,2012)

Method

Total Number of Number of Identical Percentage of Identical
Pages
Pages
Pages
131072
130365
99.46%
131072
129953
99.15%
131072
105080
80.17%

DMD(TCP)
DMD(SDCard)
fmem(SDCard)

504ENSICS (2013) reveals two types of acquisition technique on LiME. First is the acquisition of
memoryoveraTCPconnection.Onthistechnique,theexaminershouldcopythekernelmoduleto
thephone’sSDcardusingADB.AllnetworkdataistransferredviaUSB.Afterthat,thetargetdevice
shouldlistentospecifiedTCPPort(port4444)andthentheexaminershouldconnecttothedevice
fromthehostcomputer.Whilstthesocketisconnected,thekernelmodulewillautomaticallysend
the acquired RAM image to the host device.  Second is the acquisition a memory dump via the
phone’sSDcard.Thisoptionwillbetakeniftheexaminerwantstomakesurenonetworkbufferis
overwritten. In order to execute the process, the examiner should image the SD card to save
unallocated space. After that, the examiner should tethering the device to a Linux machine and
activating USB storage exposes a /dev/sd?. The device can be imaged using traditional means (eg.
usingddontheLinuxmachine).IftheSDcanberemoved,thentheexaminercouldremovetheSD
cardtoacquirethememorydump,butifcouldnotberemoved,thentheexaminercoulduseADBto
transferthememorydumptoinvestigator’smachine.

GainRootPrivileges
Every examiner before they decided to use the tools such as ADB and LiME should be aware that
theyhavetogainrootprivilegesontheAndroiddevices.TherootprivilegesinAndroiddeviceisnot
enabledbydefaultduetoasecuritymechanism.Therefore,thefirsttaskforeveryexaminerbefore
theyexecutetheADBandLiMEoranysoftwarebasedphysicaltechniqueistogainrootprivileges.
On the other hand, gaining root privileges sometimes is not an easy task. The techniques for root
privilegeswillvarynotonlyforeachmanufactureranddevicebutforeachversionofAndroidand
theLinuxkernelinuse(Hoog,2011).

ANALYSISPROCESSOFTHEMEMORYIMAGEWITHVOLATILITY2.3
According with Case (2012a) and Volatility (2013), there are at least nine analysis capabilities on
Volatilityrelease2.3.Theanalysiscapabilitiesincludeiomemandlimeinfo,processes,kernelobjects,
memory caches, networking, mounted filesystems, files in memory, rootkit detection and specific
analysis.ThereisnewfeaturesonthelatestrealeaseofVolatilitysuchasnewARMaddressspaceto
support memory dumps from Linux and Android devices on ARM, added plugins to scan linux
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process and kernel memory with yara signatures, dump LKMs to disk, and check TTY devices for
rootkithooksandaddedpluginstochecktheARMsystemcallandexceptionvectortablesforhooks.
The Volatility release 2.3 also supports the Address Space with LimeAddressSpace to be able to
analysetheacquiredmemorywithLiME(Volatility,2013).Appendice1showsthedetailinformation
regardingdetailedanalysiscapability.

In order to show the analysis capability of Volatility, the work documented several commands for
analysingtheimageevidencefromDFRWSRodeo2012name“Evo4GRodeo.lime.”

Iomemandlimeinfo
Thepluginswillprovideoutputsimilarto/proc/iomemwhichshowsthephysicaladdressescurrently
reservedforIOdeviceslikePCIandvideocardmemory.
aph4nc@aph4nc:~/Volatility 2.3$ python vol.py -f
/media/IMATION/DFRWSRodeo2012/Evo4GRodeo.lime --profile=LinuxEvo4Gx86 linux_iomem
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.3_alpha
PCI mem
0x0
0xFFFFFFFF
msm_hdmi.0
0x2B00000
0x2EFFFFF
kgsl_phys_memory
0x3700000
0x39FFFFF
kgsl
0x3700000
0x39FFFFF
ram_console
0x3A00000
0x3A3FFFF
msm_panel.1
0x3B00000
0x3DFFFFF
System RAM
0x20000000
0x2E7FFFFF
Kernel text
0x20038000
0x204D5FFF
Kernel data
0x204D6000
0x2062F617
System RAM
0x30000000
0x33FFFFFF
System RAM
0x34000000
0x3B5FFFFF
kgsl_reg_memory
0xA0000000
0xA001FFFF
kgsl
0xA0000000
0xA001FFFF
msm_serial_hs_bcm.0
0xA0200000
0xA0200FFF
msm_sdcc.1
0xA0300000
0xA0300FFF
msm_sdcc.2
0xA0400000
0xA0400FFF
msm_sdcc.3
0xA0500000
0xA0500FFF
msm_hsusb
0xA0800000
0xA0801000
spi_base
0xA1200000
0xA1200FFF
msm_i2c.0
0xA9900000
0xA9900FFF
msm_i2c
0xA9900000
0xA9900FFF
mdp
0xAA200000
0xAA2EFFFF
msm_mddi.0
0xAA600000
0xAA600FFF

ProcessesShows
The plugins show perprocessing listings, child/parent process relationship, opened files and
memorymaps.
C:\Volatility 2.3>python vol.py -f c:\Evo4GRodeo.lime --profile=LinuxEvo4Gx86 linux_psaux -p 1873
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.3_alpha
Pid Uid Arguments
1873 0
insmod /sdcard/lime-evo.ko path=tcp:4444 format=lime
Sun, 05 Aug 2012 10:33:09 +0000
C:\Volatility 2.3>python vol.py -f c:\Evo4GRodeo.lime --profile=LinuxEvo4Gx86 linux_proc_maps -p 1
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.3_alpha
0x8000- 0x20000 r-x
0 0: 1
34 /init
0x20000- 0x21000 rw98304 0: 1
34 /init
0x21000- 0x34000 rw0 0: 0
0 [heap]
0x40000000-0x40001000 r-0 0: 0
0
0x40001000-0x40011000 rw0 0:10
315 /dev/__properties__
0xbe982000-0xbe9a4000 rw0 0: 0
0 [stack]

KernelObjects
Thepluginsshowthelistofkernelmodules,debugbufferandmemorycaches.
aph4nc@aph4nc:~/Volatility 2.3$ python vol.py
profile=LinuxEvo4Gx86 linux_lsmod
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.3_alpha
lime 8014
bcm4320 228359

-f

/media/IMATION/DFRWSRodeo2012/Evo4GRodeo.lime

--
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MemoryCaches
The plugin will mimics /proc/slabinfo on a running machine, gather files from the dentry cache,
gathertasks fromthe kme_cache,recovertheroutingcachefrommemory,recoverspacketsfrom
thesk_buffkemem_cacheandgatherVMAsfromthevm_area_structcache

Networking
ThepluginwillrecovertheARPtable,replicateifconfigoutput,recovertheroutingcache,replicate
netstatoutputandrecoverpersocketpacketqueues.

aph4nc@aph4nc:~/Volatility 2.3$ python vol.py -f
/media/IMATION/DFRWSRodeo2012/Evo4GRodeo.lime --profile=LinuxEvo4Gx86 linux_ifconfig
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.3_alpha
Interface
IP Address
MAC Address
Promiscous Mode
-----------------------------------------------------------------lo
127.0.0.1
00:00:00:00:00:00
False
dummy0
0.0.0.0
00:00:00:00:00:00
False
ifb0
0.0.0.0
00:00:00:00:00:00
False
ifb1
0.0.0.0
00:00:00:00:00:00
False
rmnet0
0.0.0.0
00:00:00:00:00:00
False
rmnet1
0.0.0.0
00:00:00:00:00:00
False
rmnet2
0.0.0.0
00:00:00:00:00:00
False
usb0
0.0.0.0
00:00:00:00:00:00
False
sit0
0.0.0.0
00:00:00:00:00:00
False
ip6tnl0
0.0.0.0
00:00:00:00:00:00
False
eth0
50.94.125.176
00:00:00:00:00:00
False


aph4nc@aph4nc:~/Volatility 2.3$ python vol.py -f
/media/IMATION/DFRWSRodeo2012/Evo4GRodeo.lime --profile=LinuxEvo4Gx86 linux_arp
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.3_alpha
[::
] at 00:00:00:00:00:00
on lo
[50.94.125.1
] at 00:90:fb:34:af:ca
on eth0

MountedFilesystem
Thepluginwilllistsmountedfilesystemsincludingthemountflagsandgathermountedfs/devices
fromkmem_cache

aph4nc@aph4nc:~/Volatility 2.3$ python vol.py -f /media/IMATION/DFRWSRodeo2012/Evo4GRodeo.lime
profile=LinuxEvo4Gx86 linux_mount
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.3_alpha
tmpfs
/app-cache
tmpfs
rw,relatime
tmpfs
/mnt/obb
tmpfs
rw,relatime
tmpfs
/mnt/asec
tmpfs
rw,relatime
/dev/block/vold/179:1
/mnt/secure/asec/.android_secure vfat
rw,relatime,nosuid,nodev,noexec
/dev/block/mtdblock5
/cache
yaffs2
rw,relatime,nosuid,nodev
/dev/block/mtdblock6
/data
yaffs2
rw,relatime,nosuid,nodev
none
/acct
cgroup
rw,relatime
tmpfs
/mnt/sdcard/.android_secure
tmpfs
ro,relatime
htcfs
/data/htcfs
fuse
rw,relatime,nosuid,nodev
/dev/block/vold/179:1
/mnt/sdcard
vfat
rw,relatime,nosuid,nodev,noexec
none
/dev/cpuctl
cgrou
rw,relatime
tmpfs
/dev
tmpfs
rw,relatime

--
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devpts
devpts
rw,relatime
/dev/block/mtdblock4
ro,relatime
sysfs
sysfs
rw,relatime
/sys/kernel/debug
rw,relatime
proc
proc
rw,relatime

/dev/pts
/system

yaffs2

/sys
/sys/kernel/debug

debugfs

/proc

FilesinMemory
Thepluginshowsallfilesandentirefilesystemsthatcan berecovereddirectlyfrommemoryand
showsunencryptedcontentsofencryptedfiles.

C:\Volatility 2.3>python vol.py -f c:\Evo4GRodeo.lime --profile=LinuxEvo4Gx86 linux_tmpfs -L
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.3_alpha
1 -> /app-cache
2 -> /mnt/obb
3 -> /mnt/asec
4 -> /mnt/sdcard/.android_secure
5 -> /dev


SpecificAnalysis
Thepluginbasicallyswitchfromthekernellandonthepreviousanalysiscapabilityintouserlandto
analysetheAndroidapplications.Theaimistoanalysethespecificapplicationtofocusonthedata
structureofoneprocess.

aph4nc@aph4nc:~/Volatility 2.3$ python vol.py -f
/media/IMATION/DFRWSRodeo2012/Evo4GRodeo.lime --profile=LinuxEvo4Gx86 linux_check_creds
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.3_alpha
PIDs
-------139...97


CONSIDERATIONSONLiMEANDVOLATILITY2.3
CustomizedLoadableKernelModuleonLiME
TheLinuxkernelusesasecuritymechanismcalledmoduleverification(JoeSylve,etal.,2012).Itis
intended to prevent the kernel from accepting incompatible or possibly malicious code to being
inserted into the operating system. This feature makesit impossible to load a general module for
everytypeofAndroidsmartphone.Thereisnooptionavailabletoloadmoduleinakernelagnostic
wayforgenericsolutionapproach.Apparently,theonlyapproachisavailableistocreateapoolof
precompiledmodules.Everymoduleinthepooliscompiledagainstaspecifickernel;basicallythere
is one module for each device and Android version.  Therefore, every examiner should build the
customized Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) for each smartphone and Android version in order to
acquirephysicalmemorywithLiME(Macht,2013;Valenzuela,2013).

CreatingtheProfileonVolatility2.3
AccordingwithMacht(2013),aprofileneedstobecreatedwhichcanbepassedtoVolatilityonthe
commandline,beforeanexaminerwantstoanalysethememoryimage.AVolatilityprofileisaset
ofvtypedefinitionsandoptionalsymboladdresses.TheVolatility2.3(Alphaversion)onlyhasone
profile for Android devices: LinuxEvo4Gx86.  On the other hand, there are several profiles for
MicrosoftOperatingSystem.Therearetwomainreasonsforthat.First,Volatilitydevelopmenthas
started from a Microsoft Windows point of view and Android support is quite new, consequently
there are less corresponding profiles are available by default.  Second, there are many different
flavoursofdifferentkernelsavailableintheAndroidmarket.Moreover,everysinglevendorsuchas
HTC,SamsungorLGusuallyhasmultipledevicesrunningadifferentkernel.Theproblemwiththatis
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each kernel needs its own Volatility profile. The situation is identical with usage of LiME: every
examinerneedstocreateanownprofileforeveryAndroidsmartphoneforforensicinvestigation.

CONCLUSIONANDFUTUREWORK
The work supports the procedure for acquiring the data evidence in Android smartphones with
regard to the  order of volatility. First of all, the procedure should image the SD card in order to
createspacetostorethememorydump.EveryexaminercouldconsiderusingLiMEasthetoolfor
conductingtheacquisitionprocess.Asthetool,LiMEdeliberatestheforensicallysoundprocessand
couldcapturealmostallofthepagesonthephysicalmemory.

Volatility2.3showstheanalysiscapabilityforinvestigatingtheacquiredimageevidencewithLiME.
Severalpluginsandcommandshavebeendevelopedtogatherthespecificpurposes.Theworkhas
demonstratedtheanalysisupontheevidenceimagefromDFRWSRodeo2012.Theanalysisresult
showshowtheapplicationcouldanswerthequestionsontheforensicchallenge.

Despite the benefit that would be created from LiME and Volatility 2.3, there are two concerns
regardingwithitsusage.First,theexaminershouldgaintherootprivilegesbeforeexecutingLiME.
Sometimes this process is quite difficult task and will depend on the manufacturer, version ofthe
Android OS and Linux Kernel.  Second, there is no generic solution or approach for every type of
Androidsmartphone.ExaminersshouldcreatecustomizedLKMforeachAndroiddeviceinorderto
use LiME.  The same problem is persists on Volatility 2.3, the examiner should create a specific
profileforspecificAndroidsmartphonestobeabletoanalysetheacquiredimage.

Nevertheless,bothapplicationsareofferingthebestsolutionthatnootheroptionscouldofferfor
the digital forensics community.  Especially in acquiring and analyzing the volatile memory inthe
Androidsmartphone.Thedevelopmentofbothapplicationsisstillgrowingandneedssupportfrom
communityinordertocreatemore‘userfriendly’optionsforbothapplications.

Future works could be applied to investigate the Mobile Trojan Banking Malware Incidents,
smartphoneencryptionkeysandtemporaryfilesystemsinAndroidsmartphones.Hence,itwould
supportthedevelopmentofLiMEandVolatilityasacontributiontothedigitalforensiccommunity.
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APPENDICES01:AnalysisCapability,CommandandthePurpose
No

2

Analysis
Capability
IOMEM and
Limeinfo
Processes

3

Kernel Objects

4

Memory Caches

5

Networking

6
7

Mounted
Filesystem
Files in Memory

8

Rootkit Detection

1

Command and the Purpose
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

9

Specific Analysis

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

linux_iomem : Provides output similar to /proc/iomem
linux_cpuinfo
: Prints info about each active processor
linux_pslist
: Gather active tasks by walking the task_struct->task list
linux_pstree
: Shows the parent/child relationship between processes
linux_psaux
: Gathers processes along with full command line and start time
linux_lsof
: Lists open files
linux_memmap
: Dumps the memory map for linux tasks
linux_proc_maps
: Gathers process maps for linux
linux_dump_map
: Writes selected memory mappings to disk
linux_pidhashtable
: Enumerates processes through the PID hash table
linux_dmesg : Gather dmesg buffer
linux_lsmod : Gather loaded kernel modules
linux_slabinfo : Mimics /proc/slabinfo on a running machine
linux_dentry_cache
: Gather files from the dentry cache
linux_pslist_cache
: Gather tasks from the kmem_cache
linux_route_cache
: Recovers the routing cache from memory
linux_sk_buff_cache : Recovers packets from the sk_buff kmem_cache
linux_vma_cache
: Gather VMAs from the vm_area_struct cache
linux_ifconfig : Gathers active interfaces
linux_netstat
: Lists open sockets
linux_arp
: Print the ARP table
linux_pkt_queues
: Writes per-process packet queues out to disk
linux_mount
: Gather mounted fs/devices
linux_mount_cache
: Gather mounted fs/devices from kmem_cache
linux_tmpfs
: Recovers tmpfs filesystems from memory
linux_find_file : Recovers tmpfs filesystems from memory
linux_psxview : Find hidden processes with various process listings
linux_check_afinfo : Verifies the operation function pointers of network protocols (finds
hooks in structure that control displaying of network connections (netstat))
linux_check_fop
: Check file operation structures for rootkit modifications (finds
hooks in structures that deal with file opening, reading and writing)
inux_check_modules : Compares module list to sysfs info, if available (finds hidden
kernel modules by xrefing with sysfs)
zygote
: linux_pslist | grep zygote
atoms
: Print session and window station atom tables
atomscan
: Pool scanner for _RTL_ATOM_TABLE
clipboard
: Extract the contents of the windows clipboard
eventhooks
: Print details on windows event hooks
gahti
: Dump the USER handle type information
gditimers
: Print installed GDI timers and callbacks
linux_bash
: Recover bash history from bash process memory
linux_check_creds
: Checks if any processes are sharing credential structures
linux_check_idt
: Checks if the IDT has been altered
linux_check_syscall : Checks if the system call table has been altered
messagehooks
: List desktop and thread window message hooks
patcher
: Patches memory based on page scans
sessions
: List details on _MM_SESSION_SPACE (user logon sessions)
userhandles
: Dump the USER handle tables
windows
: Print Desktop Windows (verbose details)
wintree
: Print Z-Order Desktop Windows Tree
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